Structuring European Community Law: How Tacit Knowledge Matters by Legrand, Pierre
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 21
Number 4 Summer 1998 Article 9
1-1-1998
Structuring European Community Law: How Tacit
Knowledge Matters
Pierre Legrand
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Pierre Legrand, Structuring European Community Law: How Tacit Knowledge Matters, 21 Hastings Int'l & Comp.L. Rev. 871 (1998).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol21/iss4/9
Structuring European Community Law:
How Tacit Knowledge Matters
By PIERRE LEGRAND*
[Legal traditions] carry... in their plurality the meaning of an ar-
rangement which they entrust to a future of speech. A new kind of
arrangement which will not be that of harmony, concordance, or
conciliation, but which will accept disjunction or divergence as the
infinite center from which, through speech, a relation must be cre-
ated-an arrangement which does not compose but juxtaposes, that
is, leaves outside one another the terms coming into relation, re-
specting and preserving this exteriority and this distance as the prin-
ciple-always already undermined-of all meaning. Juxtaposition
and interruption here assume an extraordinary force of justice!
For many comparativists of my generation, Rudolf Schlesinger's
name is chiefly associated with the so-called "Cornell Project" on the
common core of legal systems! Though I remain umconvinced as to
* Professor of Comparative Legal Culture, Tilburg University, The Nether-
lands. I owe Linda Rae Legault for helping with the argument and its formulation.
1. MAuRIcE BLANCHOT, L'ENTRETIEN INFINI 453 (1969) (emphasis in original)
(translation by author). The original French text reads:
elles portent cependant, dans leur pluralit6, le sens d'un arrangement
qu'elles confient un avenir de parole. Un arrangement d'une sorte nou-
velle, qui ne sera pas celui d'une harmonie, d'une concorde ou d'une con-
ciliation, mais qui acceptera la disjonction ou la divergence comme Ie centre
infini A partir duquel, par la parole, un rapport doit s'dtablir, un arrange-
ment qui ne compose pas, mais juxtapose, e'est-4-dire laisse en dehors Ics
uns des autres les termes qui viennent en relation, respectant et prdservant
cette extgriorit et cette distance comme le principe-toujours ddjA desti-
tu6-de toute signification. La juxtaposition et l'interruption se chargent ici
d'une force de justice extraordinaire.
Blanchot had in mind Ren6 Char's lines. I paraphrase him.
2. PmRRE BoNAssIEs ET AL., FORMATION OF CoNTRAcrs: A STUDY OF THE
COMMON CORE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS (Rudolf Schlesinger ed., 1968).
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the merits of "common core" research for comparative legal studies, I
was glad to accept my colleague Ugo Mattei's generous invitation to
contribute a brief text to this Schlesinger Festschrift. No one could
deny the impact of Schlesinger's work on comparative analysis of law,
and no one should fail to bear in mind that Schlesinger lived and
worked in a language and in a country that were not his own.
When I agreed to participate in this commemorative issue, Mattei
suggested that I look at Schlesinger's last published paper, the written
version of the speech he prepared to mark his acceptance of the honor-
ary doctorate bestowed on him by the University of Trento. In this
short article, Schlesinger took the opportunity to observe how "it has
become fashionable among comparativists on both sides of the Atlan-
tis [sic] to downplay the traditional differences between civil law and
common law," and to remark on the fact that this approach is "dan-
gerously apt to derail any serious comparative study. "3 While these
passages were clearly not meant to suggest a fundamental reconsidera-
tion of the virtues of "common core" research, I wish to read them as
pointing to the need for comparativists to remind themselves, at all
times, that law comes to fulfillment only in the development of its his-
torical, social, cultural-human-significance.
Since the late 1940s, economic considerations relating to the
globalization of world markets have led an ever larger group of
Western European countries to unite in the quest for a supra-
national legal order which, in time, generated the European Commu-
nity. The European Community's early decision to promote eco-
nomic integration (and later, other types of integration) through
harmonization or unification involved, both at Community and na-
tional levels, a process of relentless juridification in the guise of leg-
islation and judicial decisions. This development was foreseeable;
once the interaction among European legal systems acted as a cata-
lyst for the creation of a supra-system, the need to achieve reciprocal
compatibility between the infra-systems and the supra-system natu-
rally fostered the advent of an extended network of inter-connections
(such as regulations and directives). As it was realized that the econ-
omy could not be neatly detached from other spheres of social action,
the question of further legal integration in the form of a "common
3. Rudolf Schlesinger, The Past and Future of Comparative Law, 43 AM. 3.
CoMp. L. 477, 480 (1995).
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law of Europe" assumed greater significance.4
Any proposal in favor of such a "common law of Europe" must
wrestle with the presence of two discrete legal traditions in the Euro-
pean Community, that is, two epistemological clusters that have crys-
tallized over the very long term.' As the observer considers the de-
velopment of law in Europe over the centuries, it appears that two
conceptions of law emerged, one based on texts and the other, largely
in reaction to the first, grounded in facts. These nomothetic and
idiographic perspectives are still with us. Most of the European
Community's legal systems claim allegiance to the former historical
configuration-what anglophones are fond of labeling the "civil law"
tradition. The later is identified as the "common law" tradition to
which only two Member States adhere; both of these States joined
the Community in the 1970s.
In brief, the notion of "legal tradition" is meant to embrace the
idea of tacit knowledge as it defines a finite horizon of meanings and
possibilities with respect to the theoretical and practical knowledge
that can be acquired within a community. It refers to an idiosyncratic
cosmology of beliefs and attitudes. This socially-generated and
shared context of meaning renders action intelligible to those in-
volved and delineates the boundaries of relevance and irrelevance
within the community. It accounts for cognitive, intuitive and emo-
tional approaches to law, legal knowledge, the role of law in society,
the way law is or should be learned, the place assumed by legislation
in the community, the function of the judge and so forth.
The civil law (or Romanist) tradition is by far the older of the
two European legal traditions. It was, and continues to be, heavily
influenced by a way of thinking about the law that developed in
Rome largely from the third century onwards. Roman law found its
most advanced expression in the massive compilation commissioned
in the early part of the sixth century by the Byzantine emperor, Jus-
tinian. This multi-volume document was enacted in the early 530s
and later came to be called the "Corpus Juris Civilis." The most in-
tellectually sophisticated part of the Corpus Juris Civilis is known as
the Institutes (or elements). Based on a second-century Roman
model, the Institutes was expressly designed to facilitate the task of
4. See Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not Converging, 45 IfT'L &
CoMp. L.Q. 52 (1996).
5. See generally GEOFFREY SAMUEL, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL REASONING
155-288 (1994).
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law students.
The Institutes ordered the law in what would be described today
as "scientific" terms. For the Institutes, law consisted of a closed and
exhaustive set of propositions or rules often in the form of pithy
statements. These rules fell into categories (one has in mind, for in-
stance, the well-known division between "private law" and "public
law").6 These categories constituted a coherent and comprehensive
system which could be taught and studied as a rational construct. In
sum, possibly the most significant defining characteristic of the intel-
lectual enterprise sponsored by Justinian was the creation of a "logi-
cal" world standing apart from the lifeworld itself. In other words, as
the Institutes made clear, "the law" is not about concrete individuals
embroiled in concrete disputes. Rather, the preoccupation lies with
individuals as disembodied bearers of rights and events as typical or
abstract contingencies.
For instance, when a dispute occurs between two persons with
respect to the entitlement to use a certain thing, the task of the judge
or jurist is to "frame" the argument in abstract terms so that it will
"fit" within one of the recognized intellectual categories. Is this dis-
pute a matter of "private law" or "public law"? Does it raise an issue
of "civil law" or "commercial law"? Does it involve a question of
"ownership" or "obligations"? Is the obligation at hand "contrac-
tual" or "delictual"? Does the problem concern "formation" or "per-
formance" of contracts? Is the difficulty a function of "consent" or
"capacity"? Is there evidence of "defective" consent? Does the "de-
fect" arise from an "error"? Is this an "error as to the substance of
the contract"?
At this stage it is likely that there will follow a learned discussion
on the meaning of "error as to the substance of the contract." This
presentation might well focus on an assessment of the notion of "sub-
stance" as interpreted by scholars having pondered the issue and ex-
pounded at length on it in the context of the entire systematic frame-
work of the law. It is always the case that the internal consistency or
unity of the whole body of law remains paramount for lawyers
steeped in the Romanist mold. In this sense, the resolution of the
dispute is seen emphatically to be a matter of law.
Given that the question for determination is how faithfully to
give effect to texts that are considered to represent the will of the
sovereign, the debate takes place at the level of the posited law. The
6. J. INST. 1.1.4.
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situation resolves itself as follows: what is the meaning of the text as
it incorporates the will of the legislator, or more daringly, what
meaning can the text be made to yield? In the course of addressing
the problem, judge and jurist alike hardly concern themselves with
the facts of the case. Indeed, once rendered the decision will stand
for a proposition of law bearing on the meaning to be ascribed to the
relevant legislative text. It is in this way that the judgement will be
introduced in textbooks. The facts of the case will promptly vanish
from the memory of the entire interpretive community. In any event,
they never did more than offer a useful opportunity for the instantia-
tion of the system's conceptual models or a salutary interpretive oc-
casion allowing for the engagement of legal science.
Since the eleventh century, the Roman way of thinking about the
law, especially as expressed in Justinian's Institutes, has meaningfully
influenced all of continental Europe. To this day, it continues to ac-
count for the manner in which a Spanish, Swedish, Greek or French
jurist understands the law.
The other intellectual formation relevant within the European
context is known as the common law tradition because it draws its
epistemological inspiration from the law that developed in the royal
courts of twelfth- and thirteenth-century England. This "royal law"
came to be known as the "common law" to mark the fact that it ap-
plied to the whole kingdom rather than varying from borough to bor-
ough or shire to shire as was the situation previously. Even in these
early days, the common law showed that it was interested in facts in-
stead of legal concepts or systemics. A judge or lawyer reckoned
with whether the facts of the matter in dispute could be "matched" to
the facts of a previous dispute. Adjudication proceeded on the basis
of the ability or inability to match fact patterns. In other words, an
argument would be successful if it established a significant connec-
tion between sets of facts. As lawyers and judges proved to be ever
more imaginative in drawing these links, the common law progres-
sively expanded. The following illustration is apposite.
A plaintiff might claim that upon his return from war, where he
had been fighting for his king, he found Smith occupying his land.
Smith would explain to the plaintiff that he bought the land in good
faith from Jones whose whereabouts were unknown. Now, the plain-
tiff's lawyer would be aware of a judicial decision in which a judge
decided in favor of a plaintiff in similar circumstances. The essential
question would be: were the circumstances actually similar in the
material sense of the term? If in the earlier case, the intruder whom
1998]
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the plaintiff found on his farm was not a person who purchased the
land in good faith but simply an individual who thought the land was
abandoned and decided to settle upon it for his own benefit, would
this difference in the facts-be material? Was it relevant that in the
earlier case the intruder colonized the land without more ado while,
in the instant case, the intruder occupied the land after buying it from
someone else? More accurately, should such a factual distinction
make a difference in the judgement of the court? As the plaintiff
would plead one way and the defendant another, it would fall to the
judge to determine whether the factual connection was sufficiently
compelling. As this example shows, the debate for common law law-
yers takes place at the level of factual isomorphs.
The common law argues on the basis of factual analogies rather
than in terms of concept meanings and locations within intellectual
systems. The aim is to point to meaningful factual connections across
a number of earlier judicial decisions in order to assert the existence
of an implicit underlying principle. The scope of that principle can
then legitimately be extended to cover the new situation. There are
several important implications to this style of reasoning. For in-
stance, the common law developed a very procedural or practical ap-
proach to adjudication. It also fostered a judicial convention that
came to be known as the doctrine of precedent which (formally) gov-
erns adjudication. Additionally, it spawned a particular view for
teaching and studying the law that reflects the pragmatism men-
tioned. To this day, the common law world still regards law more as
a craft than as a science.
In fact, the common law is "fundamentally inhospitable" to the
notion of legal science It is not an exaggeration to state that in
England a solicitor or barrister is regarded as being more akin to a
plumber or carpenter than to a philosopher or humanist. English
lawyers remain interested in the concrete dimensions of the life of
the law and show little appetite for abstraction. An English judge re-
cently observed that "rules should have no place when deciding ques-
tions of practical convenience."8 Another English judge wrote that
"[a]ll... cases depend on their own facts and render generalisations
... wholly out of place."9
7. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 66 (2d ed. 1985).
8. R. v. Wicks, 2 W.L.R. 876, 882 (H.L. 1997).
9. Re T (a minor), 1 All E.R. 906, 917 (C.A. 1997).
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As one becomes more familiar with the Romanist and common
law traditions, it is crucial to recall that barely two generations or so
after it emerged, the common law had its first opportunity to Ro-
manize.0 In the early part of the thirteenth century, Roman law be-
gan earnestly to consolidate its hold over continental Europe. This
was accomplished largely through the works of Italian jurists who
were putting on paper their observations on the Corpus Juris Civilis.
At the time, the Corpus Juris Civilis was the privileged object of
study in the law faculties that were being established all over conti-
nental Europe (not unlike the way in which the works of Aristotle
had become the most important focus of learning for philosophers).
Yet, in the face of this incipient Romanization of European legal
cultures, the common law elected to assert its Englishness. By this
time, the common law was unique in Europe; it had become a strong,
centralized and national legal system characterized by the administra-
tive reforms that took place at the end of the twelfth century. Resis-
tance to the civil law tradition was expressed in several forms. In
1234, Henry IlI prohibited the teaching of Roman law in London."
At the Merton Parliament of 1236, the English barons, in what has
been depicted as "an outburst of nationality and conservatism,""! op-
posed the clergy's request to modify English marriage laws with the
famous exclamation, "nolumus leges Angliae mutare" ["we do not
want our English laws changed"]. In 1237, an English judge coun-
seled an English lawyer against using legal materials from across the
English Channel.
It is important to observe that this resistance to the Romanist
way of approaching law and legal knowledge continued over the cen-
turies so much so that in England there never was a "reception" of
Roman law as occurred in Germany, for instance. Incidentally, this is
the reason why it is a mistake to suggest that there once was a 'jus
commune" over the whole of Europe. What jus commune existed
was limited to continental Europe and never embraced mainstream
English law. The unpopularity of Roman law is demonstrated by the
10. See R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, THE BIRTH OFTHE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 85-1 10
(2d ed. 1988).
11. See PAUL VINOGRADOFF, RoMAN LAW IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 98 (F. de Zu-
leta ed., 2d ed. 1929).
12. See 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 189 (2d ed. 1968).
13. 3 Bracton's Note Book 1227, at 243 (F.W. Maitland ed., London, C. Clay
1887).
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fact that in the early part of the seventeenth century, Lord Coke,
perhaps the most famous English judge ever, did not hesitate to say
that Roman law was "monstrous" and compare it to a "poyson."
'1 4
Likewise, the distinguished lawyer, Sir John Davies, mocked the civil
law tradition as being "gloss upon gloss, and book upon book, and
every Doctor's opinion being a good authority fit to be cited. '' "S
It is fair to assume that these accusations were not wholly unre-
lated to the English rupture with the Church of Rome enacted into
law by Henry VIII in 1534, but a few decades before Coke and Da-
vies would blow the patriotic trumpet. Unsurprisingly, when Black-
stone published his famous Commentaries on the Laws of England in
the 1760s and elected to model his table of contents on 'the outline of
the Institutes, he created no school. His book met with a lukewarm
reception from practitioners. Typical was the reaction of James
Mackintosh who rejected "the attempt to give an air of system, of
simplicity, and of rigorous demonstration, to subjects which do not
admit it. '16 Practitioners wanted a consideration of the nature of law
through history and practice rather than through theory.
As my reference to Blackstone should make clear, I am not ar-
guing that Roman law had no influence whatsoever on English law.
Such a contention would be excessive. In fact, one can identify a
number of circumscribed and marginal ways in which Roman law
made an impact on the law of England. However, the ascendancy of
Roman law on English law was consistently limited and exceptional.
It could never change the way common law lawyers thought about
the law; it could not have displaced the dominant set of epistemologi-
cal assumptions that centered on the importance of pleadings and
procedure. The common law always aimed to remedy any wrong cor-
rectly presented, and the courts always sought to do justice between
contestants without defining rules a priori.
The events around 1200, 1600 and 1800 show that after the
common law began to develop in its idiosyncratic way, it never al-
lowed a change of epistemological paradigm. This was largely due to
nationalistic reasons that had to do with the desire to define the
common law as "unique" or "different."17 The fact that the common
14. Edward Coke, Preface to the Seventh Part, 4 Coke Rep. iii, Vi.
15. LE PRIMER REPORT DES CASES & MATTERS EN LEY RESOLUE & ADIUDOE EN
LES COURTS DEL ROY EN IRELAND fol. 4b-5a (Dublin, John Franckton 1615).
16. JAMES MACKINTOSH, A DISCOURSE ON THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF NATURE
AND NATIONS 54 (London, T. Cadell et al. 1799).
17. See generally Peter Goodrich, Poor Illiterate Reason: History, Nationalism
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law, despite its reiterated desire for epistemological closure, was ef-
fectively influenced by the civil law at various junctures in its history
does not change anything about the epistemological difference be-
tween the two legal traditions today. Whenever Roman views were
internalized, they were either modified or combined with native
ideas, and were, in any event, meant to further the advancement of
English law. This phenomenon was evidenced in the first books on
English law written in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.
Authors like Glanvill and Bracton drew on Roman themes in order
to strengthen native legal doctrine. Their aim was emphatically to
produce a credible text on English law for their times. They believed
that an infusion of ideas derived from what was regarded as the foun-
tainhead of scientific law could assist them in their task.
The common law as we know it today is, therefore, different
from the civil law as we know it today. The common law tradition
emerges as being at variance with the Romanist tradition in funda-
mental epistemological respects, differences desired by the common
law. The question arises as to how the emerging legal system within
the European Community can accommodate this pluralism which, I
argue, it has a historical and ethical responsibility to respect and
treasure.
The matter is particularly compelling if one bears in mind, as one
should, that law never exists in a vacuum. In fact, lav reflects deeply
embedded cultural assumptions so that the explanation as to why
English lawyers mistrust generalizations or systemic constructs con-
nects with an entire English way of life. In this sense, the common
law is best regarded as a specific form of moral inquiry, which allows
English lawyers to pursue their quest for meaning and justice. My
contention, in other words, is that the difference between these legal
traditions is not simply about technical rules facilitating market
transactions and enhancing profit margins. If this were the problem,
the matter of legal integration in Europe would not detain me for
very long. Out of different rules a new rule can always be framed. I
argue that the difference lies at a much more profound level than
rules, and for that reason, it is much more significant.
The Romanist and common law traditions give effect to two dif-
ferent ways of life in the law. The conflict between systematic theory
and historiography that they illustrate is really only a rendition of the
larger opposition between universality and particularity in knowl-
and Common Law, 1 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 7 (1992).
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edge."8 Each legal tradition captures a certain disposition of the mind
toward reality that is the existence of presuppositions, fears and am-
bitions often arising beneath awareness which stubbornly resist the
erosions of historical change. The issue is not sets of rules or institu-
tions but mentalitgs or worldviews. It may help to think of each legal
tradition as a religious faith. How, then, is European integration to
proceed if it is to respect religion as a constitutive element of the way
in which communities and individuals define themselves over time?
I shall confine myself to a few general observations. First, it is
illusory to expect participants in a given legal tradition to transcend
their epistemological space. To expect that a Dutch lawyer can ever
think about the law like an English lawyer-for instance, that he can
feel the same emotions toward judges or statutes-is fanciful and
shows a misapprehension of the workings of the unconscious sources
of social behavior. Second, it would be a technocratic fallacy of the
first order (albeit not an inconceivable one coming from the rootless
bureaucrats and managers operating in Brussels within abstract and
instrumental frameworks rather than through cultural and moral
commitment) to expect that the allegiance of a legal tradition can be
secured by forcing it to embrace the epistemological assumptions
promoted by another tradition. I have just argued, in any event, that
such an enterprise would be doomed to cognitive failure. Third, both
legal traditions must be recognized as epistemic peers in that they af-
ford two legitimate approaches to the law which reflect and answer
the needs of their respective communities.
Fourth, it is, therefore, the case that European legal integration
can not follow a cognitive or institutional model that would be typical
of only one of the two legal traditions. For instance, suggestions for a
European civil code must be rejected because the common law has
never wanted a code, not out of caprice or because it did not know
codes existed or felt it did not have the resources to achieve codifica-
tion. The common law does not want a code because codified law
does not correspond to its conception of justice, which simply does
not believe that society can profitably be invented and planned on
the basis of abstract theory." For the common law, it does not make
sense to consider an analytic structure, no matter how sophisticated
(and, perhaps, especially if highly sophisticated), to be the ultimate
18. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 21-22 (1976).
19. See Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, 60 MOD. L. REv. 44
(1997).
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reality as opposed to the chaos of experience.
Fifth, a meta-language must be devised which will allow partici-
pants in each of the two legal traditions to identify comforting legal-
cultural forms at the European level and foster faith in the new struc-
tures. Sixth, such a meta-language is only possible if participants in
each tradition are prepared to accept the legitimacy and validity of
the epistemological experience of law developed by the other legal
tradition. They must be willing to "step out of themselves" and try to
appreciate how and why the other legal tradition thinks the way it
does. They must strive, through a travail de soi sur soi, to think dif-
ferently from the way they were conditioned to do by their own cul-
ture.
In sum, the objective-and the only ethically commendable ob-
jective-is to find a form that will allow each legal tradition to con-
tinue to realize its own vision of its own world. The point is not only
made at a moral level. If the emerging European legal system will be
workable at all, it must secure the agreement of its various constitu-
encies. Only respect for the integrity of different ways of thinking
and being in the law can avoid the manifestation of discord.?
20. JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN AGE OF
DivniRsrry 197 (1995).
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